Social scientists have not integrated relevant knowledge from the biological sciences into their explanations of human behavior. This failure is due to a longstanding antireductionistic bias against the natural sciences, which follows on a commitment to the view that social facts must be explained by social laws. This belief has led many social scientists into the error of reifying abstract analytical constructs into entities that possess powers of agency. It has also led to a false nature-culture dichotomy that effectively undermines (...) the place of biology in social scientific explanation. Following the principles of methodological individualism, we show how behavioral explanations supported by data and theory from the neurosciences can be used to correct the errors of reificationist thinking in the social sciences. We outline a mechanistic approach to the explanation of human behavior with the hope that the biological sciences will begin to find greater acceptance among social scientists. (shrink)

This book interprets Thomas Hardy’s _Tess of the D’Urbervilles_ with the openness toward experience recommended by John Dewey’s _Art as Experience_. The characters of _Tess_ are considered as real people with sexual bodies and complex minds. Efron identifies the “experience blockers” that the critical tradition has stumbled upon, and defends Hardy’s involvement in telling his story. Efron offers a new way of evaluating literature inspired by Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics.

This book interprets Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles with the openness toward experience recommended by John Dewey’s Art as Experience . The characters of Tess are considered as real people with sexual bodies and complex minds. Efron identifies the “experience blockers” that the critical tradition has stumbled upon, and defends Hardy’s involvement in telling his story. Efron offers a new way of evaluating literature inspired by Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics.

In the early 18th Century, Daniel Defoe found it natural to write a novel whose heroine was a sexually adventurous, socially marginal property offender. Only half a century later, this would have been next to unthinkable. In this paper, the disappearance of Moll Flanders, and her supercession in the annals of literary female offenders by heroines like Tess of the d'Urbervilles, serves as a metaphor for fundamental changes in ideas of selfhood, gender and social order in 18th and 19th Century (...) England. Drawing on law, literature, philosophy and social history, I argue that these broad changes underpinned a radical shift in mechanisms of responsibility-attribution, with decisive implications for the criminalisation of women. I focus in particular on the question of how the treatment and understanding of female criminality was changing during the era which saw the construction of the main building blocks of the modern criminal process, and of how these understandings related in turn to broader ideas about gender, social order and individual agency. (shrink)

Some philosophers, like Alex Rosenberg, claim that natural science delivers epistemic values such as knowledge and understanding, whereas, say, literature and, according to some, literary studies, merely have aesthetic value. Many of those working in the field of literary studies oppose this idea. But it is not clear exactly how works of literary art embody knowledge and understanding and how literary studies can bring these to the light. After all, literary works of art are pieces of fiction, which suggests that (...) they are not meant to represent the actual world. How then can they deliver knowledge and understanding? I argue that literature and literary studies confer knowledge and understanding in at least five ways: they give us insight into the work and the world of the work of art in question, they shape our intellectual virtues, they invite us to apply various hypotheses, they deliver moral propositional knowledge, and they increase or bring about full understanding with respect to meaning, virtue, and significance. In the course of my argument, I refer at several junctures to Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles and Edith Wharton’s Summer, in order to illustrate each of these claims. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:^ be clear and sometimes ambiguous. For example, Del Castillo warns readers ^ that Dewey will be ambivalent about when and where the actions of the KH state or of the free market are needed to deal with social problems. The ^* ambivalence is, in part, Del Castillo argues, because Dewey's view of the / complexities of social life prevented him from adopting simplistic political stands (p. 33). Del (...) Castillo's argument is correct, but a more straightforward explanation is that Dewey was a contextualist and that, therefore, the theoretical task of trying to set the proper limits of the state is ideological and non-intelligent. This is how one can stand on the ideal of democracy without the need to decide between laissez-faire liberalism and socialism for all times and places. Del Castillo warns the reader not to expect from The Public and its Problems the precision and systematic character of recent works on political theory, but that it has an energetic and provocative character missing in much contemporary works in this area of inquiry. Del Castillo is correct and part of the reason is the book's continued relevance to present conditions in the U.S. If things in the U.S. had gone in the direction that Dewey pointed toward, there would be no need today to read or to translate The Public and its Problems. As Del Castillo says in his final sentences, "abundance ended up replacing the civic citizen by the consumer", "American democracy does not look at all like what Dewey envisioned" (p. 54). Does this means that Lippman was right after all? Does it mean that we have not even tried, or tried hard enough, to implement what Dewey proposed? Del CastiUo, does not address these questions, but there is no reason why he should. It is enough that Del Castillo has made available to a larger audience a text and an insightful introduction that helps us have a thoughtful discussion about these important issues. Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas A&M Univeristy, [email protected] Arthur Efron Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles: A Deweyan Account Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005. xiii+248 pp. $ 72.00 cloth. In Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles, Arthur Efron has accomplished a rather extraordinary task. The book consists primarily of an extended reading of Thomas Hardy's novel using some of John Dewey's main philosophical ideas and concepts, most notably those present in Art as Experience, as a guide. As such, Efron's text amplifies and enriches our understanding of Hardy, Dewey, and their work. I am not using the word "enrich" casually. Through Efron's emotionally charged reading of Tess, Experiencing Tess, becomes an ongoing effort to reclaim what Dewey, in Art as Experience calls oje) "human experience." In that text, Dewey contrasts "human experience" to stagnant and encrusted modes of criticism that fail to "cope with the emer- 7° gence of new modes of life," and this matters because, to use Dewey's own words again, "the very meaning of an important new movement in any art κ-1 is that it expresses something new in human experience, some new form of. interaction of the live creature with his surroundings, and hence the release, of powers previously cramped or inert." Efron 's book is enriching in that sense, in offering readers an "experience," a completely novel way of doing criticism, of reading, and of "feeling" together with a text. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that I do not know of any other work of recent literary criticism that accomplishes this. Experiencing Tess focuses most particularly on what we might call the vicissitudes of Tess's character and humanity. Yet, as is noted recurrently throughout the text, these ideas can never be entirely separated from Tess's interaction with the various characters that populate Hardy's text, especially of course Angel and Alec. Because Tess's fortunes (or, rather, misfortunes) throughout the novel are, in this richly textured book, carefully digested and interpreted in light of Dewey's understanding of experience, Efron invites us, further, to consider our own relationships with authority and with often unreflective critical practices. Let me specify. It is all too easy to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:^ be clear and sometimes ambiguous. For example, Del Castillo warns readers ^ that Dewey will be ambivalent about when and where the actions of the KH state or of the free market are needed to deal with social problems. The ^* ambivalence is, in part, Del Castillo argues, because Dewey's view of the / complexities of social life prevented him from adopting simplistic political stands (p. 33). Del (...) Castillo's argument is correct, but a more straightforward explanation is that Dewey was a contextualist and that, therefore, the theoretical task of trying to set the proper limits of the state is ideological and non-intelligent. This is how one can stand on the ideal of democracy without the need to decide between laissez-faire liberalism and socialism for all times and places. Del Castillo warns the reader not to expect from The Public and its Problems the precision and systematic character of recent works on political theory, but that it has an energetic and provocative character missing in much contemporary works in this area of inquiry. Del Castillo is correct and part of the reason is the book's continued relevance to present conditions in the U.S. If things in the U.S. had gone in the direction that Dewey pointed toward, there would be no need today to read or to translate The Public and its Problems. As Del Castillo says in his final sentences, "abundance ended up replacing the civic citizen by the consumer", "American democracy does not look at all like what Dewey envisioned" (p. 54). Does this means that Lippman was right after all? Does it mean that we have not even tried, or tried hard enough, to implement what Dewey proposed? Del CastiUo, does not address these questions, but there is no reason why he should. It is enough that Del Castillo has made available to a larger audience a text and an insightful introduction that helps us have a thoughtful discussion about these important issues. Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas A&M Univeristy, [email protected] Arthur Efron Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles: A Deweyan Account Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005. xiii+248 pp. $ 72.00 cloth. In Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles, Arthur Efron has accomplished a rather extraordinary task. The book consists primarily of an extended reading of Thomas Hardy's novel using some of John Dewey's main philosophical ideas and concepts, most notably those present in Art as Experience, as a guide. As such, Efron's text amplifies and enriches our understanding of Hardy, Dewey, and their work. I am not using the word "enrich" casually. Through Efron's emotionally charged reading of Tess, Experiencing Tess, becomes an ongoing effort to reclaim what Dewey, in Art as Experience calls oje) "human experience." In that text, Dewey contrasts "human experience" to stagnant and encrusted modes of criticism that fail to "cope with the emer- 7° gence of new modes of life," and this matters because, to use Dewey's own words again, "the very meaning of an important new movement in any art κ-1 is that it expresses something new in human experience, some new form of. interaction of the live creature with his surroundings, and hence the release, of powers previously cramped or inert." Efron 's book is enriching in that sense, in offering readers an "experience," a completely novel way of doing criticism, of reading, and of "feeling" together with a text. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that I do not know of any other work of recent literary criticism that accomplishes this. Experiencing Tess focuses most particularly on what we might call the vicissitudes of Tess's character and humanity. Yet, as is noted recurrently throughout the text, these ideas can never be entirely separated from Tess's interaction with the various characters that populate Hardy's text, especially of course Angel and Alec. Because Tess's fortunes (or, rather, misfortunes) throughout the novel are, in this richly textured book, carefully digested and interpreted in light of Dewey's understanding of experience, Efron invites us, further, to consider our own relationships with authority and with often unreflective critical practices. Let me specify. It is all too easy to... (shrink)

In Tess of the d’Urbervilles, the innocent Tess is the object of Alec d’Urberville’s dishonorable intentions. Alec uses every wile he can think of to seduce the poor and ignorant Tess, who works keeping hens in his mother’s house: he flatters her, he impresses her with a show of wealth, he gives help to her family to win her gratitude, and he reacts with irritation and indignation when she nonetheless continues to repulse his advances, causing her to feel shame at (...) her own ingratitude and confusion as to what is right. Tess, anchored both by her own sense of virtue and her distrust of Alec’s character, continues to hold out until one fatal night when, through Alec’s machinations, they are lost together in a wood. At Tess’s insistence Alec leaves her to scout out the path home. When he returns, he finds her asleep under a tree. Hardy does not go into detail at this critical juncture. Rather, he reflects “why it was that upon this beautiful feminine tissue, sensitive as gossamer, and practically blank as snow as yet, there should have been traced such a coarse pattern as it was doomed to receive; why so often the coarse appropriates the finer thus, the wrong man the woman, the wrong woman the man, many thousand years of analytical philosophy have failed to explain to our sense of order.”. (shrink)

It is a truth universally acknowledged that great works of literature have an impact on people's lives. Well known literary characters—Oedipus, Hamlet, Faustus, Don Quixote—acquire iconic or mythic status and their stories, in more or less detail, are revered and recalled often in contexts far beyond the strictly literary. At the level of national literatures, familiar characters and plots are assimilated into a wider cultural consciousness and help define national stereotypes and norms of behaviour. In the English speaking world, Shakespeare's (...) plays or the novels of Jane Austen, the Bronte sisters, Dickens, and Trollope, provide imaginative material that reverberates in people's lives every bit as much as do the great historical figures, like Julius Caesar, Elizabeth I, Horatio Nelson, or Winston Churchill. What is striking is how often fictional characters from the literary tradition—like the well-loved Elizabeth Bennett, Jane Eyre, Oliver Twist, Pip, Tess of the d'Ubervilles—enter readers' lives at a highly personal level. They become, as Martha Nussbaum puts it, our ‘friends’, and for many readers the lives of these characters become closely entwined with their own. Happy and unhappy incidents in the fictional worlds are held up against similar incidents in the real lives of readers and such readers take inspiration from the courage, ingenuity, or good fortune of their fictional heroines and heroes. Nowhere is it more true that life imitates art. (shrink)

This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to (...) most of the metaphysical questions it provokes, concerning the relation of time to space, the dissection of time, and its relation to change and causation. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reconsider Barthes’s theory of textuality, as presented in his The Pleasure of the Text. Barthes’s approach is based on the rejection of the “referential” or “realistic” theories of literary text: the Barthesian pleasure is drawn from the texture of the text itself rather that from its alleged referential character. In this sense, the author’s suggestion is to return to the notion of representation rejected by Barthes, even though this representation should not be identical (...) with the reference in the classical sense of the word. The notion of “weak representation”, suggested by the author, does not mean a return to a naïve conception of realism. It rather implies that the referent would be a fantasmatic rather than “realistic” entity. The notions of representation and reference are exemplified by the interpretation of Richardson’s Clarissa and Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbevilles. (shrink)

This article is a response to an essay written by an academic in English Literature, Professor John Sutherland. Through close textual analysis,Sutherland purports to resolve a well-known literary question: whether the sexual encounter outlined in the Victorian novel Tess of the d'Urbervilles should be classified as rape or seduction. The present article rejects his conclusion on the matter. An(equally) close analysis of the fictional text in question and of Sutherland's gloss, demonstrates the partiality of his critique, both in literary-critical and (...) critical-legal terms. In addition, examination of the conceptual and historico-legal context regarding the notions of rape and seduction on both sides of the Atlantic highlights parallels between Sutherland's own partiality and that of the law. In short, the apparent objectivity of the textual analysis and subsequent critique undertaken by Sutherland is revealed as a continuation of legal and patriarchal prejudices defining rape and seduction. The use of close textual analysis as the key critical device promotes the apparent probity of his findings. Locating them in an essay collection designed for mass lay public consumption completes the circle – from partisan scholarship to `informed' popular prejudice. (shrink)

This article argues that blacks should reject integration on self-protective and solidarity grounds. It distinguishes two aspects of black devaluation: a ‘stigmatization’ aspect that has to do with the fact that blacks are subject to various forms of discrimination, and an aesthetic aspect (‘phenotypic devaluation’) that concerns the aesthetic devaluation of characteristically black phenotypic traits. It identifies four self-worth harms that integration may inflict, and suggests that these may outweigh the benefits of integration. Further, it argues that, while the integrating (...) process may reduce stigmatization, there is less reason to think that it can do the same for phenotypic devaluation. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to explain one of the most controversial views attributed to the Stoic Chrysippus: that the impossible can follow from the possible. My solution finds in Chrysippus a distinction later made by the medieval logician John Buridan: that between being possible (there being a state of affairs that may occur) and being possibly-true (there being some proposition whose truth-conditions are that state of affairs). Buridan and Chrysippus have radically opposing views on the nature of propositions. What (...) their conceptions share is the conclusion that at least some propositions must be contingent beings. They argue for this while maintaining a rigorous commitment to the view that propositions are strictly bivalent. In 2. I explain the Chrysippean passage in terms of a distinction Buridan makes explicitly. In 3. I show how the distinction follows implicitly from the Stoic theory of quantification. In 4. I compare the modality with other aspects of Stoic logic. In 5. I discuss how the distinction behaves in the future tense. (shrink)

How should one respond to scepticism? Should one seek to refute it? Or should scepticism be ignored? This paper argues that descriptive metaphysics occupies an intermediate logical space between truth-directed transcendental arguments aimed at refuting the sceptic and the quietist stance of the Humean naturalist who declines to take up the sceptical challenge. Descriptive metaphysics is neither quietist nor confrontational. It seeks to show, rather, that the sceptic is not a genuine partner in conversation.

The renewed engagement with Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom in management and organization studies is reflective of the wider turn towards practice sweeping across many disciplines. In this sense, it constitutes a welcome move away from the traditional rationalist, abstract, and mechanistic modes of approaching ethical decision-making. Within the current engagement, practical wisdom is generally conceptualized, interpreted or read as a form of deliberation or deliberative judgement that is also cognizant of context, situatedness, particularity, lived experience, and so on. We (...) argue that while this way of conceptualizing practical wisdom moves closer to practice in accounting for the concrete and particular reality within which individuals enact ethics, it does not adequately account for practice in the ontological and relational sense posited in practice theories. Practical wisdom conceptualized on the _deliberative_ dimension still retains a higher emphasis on distinct entities (individuals/institutions), reflexive agency, conscious mental states, goal-directed action, and intentionality. In other words, it puts a higher stress on individual _wisdom_, as opposed to _practice_ or the relational interaction of the individual and social inhering in practice. We offer an alternative conceptualization of practical wisdom based on the _dispositional_ mode of being in the world which is rarely deliberate, intentional, or reflective. Our conceptualization integrates Aristotle’s original ethical framework, which is already embedded in a practice-based ontology, with insights from practice theories to show how practical wisdom is intuitively channelled in the _dispositional_ mode in a given social configuration of virtues/ends. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK R]]JVIEWS room for different theories and new developments. He does not try to tie up every loose end. Furthermore, he avoids the rut of the specialist by willingly and capably addressing questions of biblical exegesis, philosophy, psychology, science, and popular culture with even-handed competence. Space does not permit me to discuss his fascinating analysis of the psychology of near-death experiences or specific rejoinders to important objections (e.g., the (...) Bible depicts the dead as bodily beings, not immaterial spirits; dualism is a result of the Fall; dualism implies that the whole person does not die; at death we pass out of time, and, hence, there is no intermediate state). But I can assure you that his account is cogent and illuminating. Lenoir-Rhyne College Hickory, North Carolina PHILIP BLOSSER: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective. Edited by KENNETH L DEUTSCH AND WALTER SOFFER. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Pp. ix+ 304. $54.50 (cloth); $18.95 (paper). For Leo Strauss, the superiority of classical political philosophy over modern social science (and political theory based on social science) lies in at least four principles. First, it treats political matters as they actually appear to man qua philosopher and, in a qualified way, to the good citizen. Because Strauss claims that social science (and much post-classical political philosophy) abstracts from his canon of intelligibility, he thinks that it cannot lead to a humane, rational politics. (See "What is Political Philosophy?", in What is Political Philosophy? [Westport: Greenwood], pp. 27-28, and "Distinction between Facts and Values" in Natural Right and History [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953], pp. 78-80.) Second, Plato and Aristotle believed that only the good man properly judges politics. This belief attracts Strauss, because it identifies virtue as the best claimant to political rule. ("What is Political Philosophy? ", pp. 36-38.) A third principle is derived immediately from this second: politics ought to be organized hierarchically. In the hierarchy, either the truly virtuous or gentlemen should rule, and those having a passive, obediential form of virtue should be the ruled. Fourth, this arrangement is rational and humane. For although the virtues of the ruler and the ruled are complementary in justice and necessary to it, still they are different and, in fact, require the stratification just mentioned. ("Classic Natural Right" in Natural Right and History, pp. 130-44.) BOOK REVIEWS 527 Because of the controversial nature of these principles and Strauss's eminence in political philosophy, one welcomes the present collection of essays by his disciples. They believe that in liberal democracies people confuse liberty with the uses to which liberty can and ought to be put. Doing so, people undermine that regime's foundations. Strauss and his disciples believe that modern natural right makes the clash between liberty and natural right inevitable, because its principal founders, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, conceived man as non-political. They conceived individuals as gaining certain advantages from governments hut as gaining no good in the exercise of politics itself. Classic natural right, by contrast, bases itself on the assumption that man is radically political. Moreover, it conceives politics as an arena for liberating, ennobling activities. Hobbes and Locke viewed the individual as independent of politics, which they placed at the low end of the range of human activity, along with everyday concerns and popular morality, rather than at the high end, as Strauss would. Thus for Strauss, liberal democracy is founded on modern principles, which are either apolitical and liberal (Locke) or apolitical and illiberal (Hobbes). Consequently, it cannot withstand the individualist and collectivist onslaughts that we have seen in this century. What, then, have Strauss's disciples to say about liberal democracy and the prospect of classic natural right in a Western world which is more or less permanently Hobbesian-Lockean? This can be answered by describing first the hook's divisions and then its diagnoses and prescriptions. In part one the contributors appraise the work of Strauss itself; in part two they define issues in liberalism ; and in part three they discuss liberalism in American political life. In the first part, Michael Platt outlines how Strauss's thought... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 719 An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic of lnterreligious Dialogue. By PAUL J. GRIFFITHS. New York: Orbis, 1991. ISBN: 0 88344 761 4. pp. 113. Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions. By J. DUPUIS. New York: Orbis, 1991 (ET: Robert R. Barr, from French, 1989). ISBN: 0 88344 723 1. pp. 301. Griffiths presents a rigorous argument for the possibility of con· (...) tradictory claims between different religious communities. His inspira· tion, as he acknowledges, is William Christian Snr. His basic argu· ment is: " If representative intellectuals belonging to some specific religious community come to judge at a particular time that some or all of their own doctrine-expressing sentences are incompatible with some alien religious claim(s), then they should feel obliged to engage in both positive and negative apologetics vis-a-vis these alien religious claim(s) and their promulgators" (3). He takes negative apologetics to be a critique of arguments made against one's own religious claims, showing that such arguments fail or are inconsistent or incoherent. Positive apologetics shows how a particular religious community's doctrines are cognitively superior, in some respect(s), to another religious community 's doctrines. It is essential for this enterprise that only methods of argumentation and criteria of knowledge acceptable to the adversary are employed. This requires the acceptance of natural theology. Griffiths is well aware of the lion's den he is entering, as his proposals run counter to much scholarship in the area of interreligious dialogue, so he spends three chapters apologetically tackling the lions. The objectors (who mainly remain in notes) include Derrida, Barthes, Winch, Lindbeck, Hick, Huxley, Nasr, Plantinga and others, although Mac· Intyre is curiously missing. This technique has the advantage of isolating and presenting arguments, without falling into problems of cor· rect exegesis of opponents. And this is also its weakness, as objectors will sometimes feel caricatured or misunderstood-as is surely the case with Plantinga and in one instance, Hick. First, he tackles objections that sentences from one tradition are either incomprehensible or incommensurable with those of another, convincingly showing that the strong versions of both claims are self· defeating and unsustainable. Weaker versions still allow for his proj· ect-or so he thinks. This is where Maclntyre's work should have been considered. Then he tackles various theories of religious language (following Lindbeck's typology). He argues against non-cognitive accounts that reduce beliefs to the credibility of causes for holding beliefs, a position incapable of asserting its truth over other views because of its 720 BOOK REVIEWS own presuppositions. He follows Lindbeck in criticizing experiental expressivism, and then turns upon Lindbeck's own form of rule theory (which is ambivalent regarding cognitive claims), arguing convincingly that to suggest that only sentences uttered confessionally and with performative function can possess ontological truth is confused (42). In a brief review it is not possible to rehearse Griffiths's careful argumentation. Griffiths then sets about tackling two types of universalists: Hick and Huxley. Of Hick, he argues that some criteria are required to discern true from false religions (e.g. Jim Jones) and in so doing such a position needs to support and develop such criteria, thereby effectively introducing apologetics. He neglects to deal with Hick's pragmatic criteria of beneficial ' fruits ' evident in adherents, but the logic of his argument can be applied to Hick's proposals. Using Katz and Zaehner, he argues against the esoteric universalism of the philosophia perennis. (The arguments of Robert Forman's recent book, The Problems of Pure Consciousness, are strangely neglected, despite Griffiths's being a contributor to that collection.) Finally, he tackles objections against positive apologetics-first, on the grounds that it has a negative effect on interreligious relations. Logically, this need not be the case, although Griffiths is well aware that the political context of apologetics can obscure its proper goal: deeper critical understanding, learning and problem solving. Then, in sustained dialogue with Plantinga, he argues against the objection that success is impossible. It is impossible only if " knockdown drag-out" (64) argumentative victory is expected. Griffiths suggests the cumulative -case argument and gives instances of such successful apologetics (medieval... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:530 BOOK REVIEWS I think none of these books contains a wholly satisfactory treatment of the particular issues it takes up. Taken together, however, they do show that evil presents not just one but many problems to reflective religious minds. In addition, they make it perfectly evident that not just one but many academic disciplines continue to have helpful things to say in response to these gripping perplexities. University (...) of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana PHILIP L. QUINN Di,alogue with the Other: The Inter-religious Dialogue. By DAVID TRACY. Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 1. Louvain : Peeters; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990. Pp. 123. $12.95. With this book David Tracy continues the hermeneutical project he launched in the Analogical Imagination: a concern to converse with the classics and to encounter the ' other '. However, here the ' other ' is extended beyond the traditional Western classics to the religions of the world and the often neglected archaic traditions. Tracy is surely correct when he says: " I believe that we are fast approaching the day when it will not be possible to attempt Christian systematic theology except in serious conversation with the other great ways" (p. xi). Here he follows a pioneering line drawn in Chicago by Tillich, Eliade and Kitagawa. Tracy brings to this venerable tradition his particular concern with hermeneutics and his experience with Jewish-Christian and Buddhist-Christian dialogue. The essays are further united by Tracy's desire to restore the unity between the mystical and prophetic within the Christian tradition. Employing Kenneth Burke's analysis of rhetoric, Chapter one shows that Freud and Lacan can be interpreted in terms of a clash of prophetic and mystical rhetorics respectively. Both are concerned with the ' other ', Freud more instrumentally and didactically and Lacan more subversively and anarchically but not nihilistically or in the way of Zen. In this chapter Tracy has a tendency towards overdetermination. Still, the brunt of his argument is that all discourse has concealed foundations, the archaeology of which will help illuminate the opera· tive rhetoric. Furthermore, the mystical/prophetic typology used in religion can illuminate secular issues, viz., the debate between Freud and Lacan. However, Tracy does not pay full attention to the nature of the 'other', but too easily assimilates it. For instance, is Freud's attention to the subconscious analogous to religious rhetoric's regarding the otherness of God? And does it really serve Tracy's purpose to start BOOK REVIEWS 531 the book by remammg within such very western waters despite the brave navigational direction he charted in the introduction? Chapter two revisits the classics: he uses the writings of William James to throw light on the criteria for interreligious dialogue. These criteria are used to affirm the authenticity of religions; these are not intended to " replace the dialogue but, at best, heuristically to inform it" (p. 27). Tracy offers a good and sensitive appreciation of James (despite his anachronistic elements), but his conclusions are somewhat thinly related to James's work and relate more closely to Tracy's own hermeneutical approach. The three criteria that he advances are: first, the notion of " immediate luminousness," understood as manifestation in a Heideggerian sense (and in keeping with von Balthasar) ; second, the necessity of coherence, understood as the compatibility of religious belief with science, art, and other humanistic traditions; and third, an ethical-pragmatic criterion related to James's notion of "fruits." With regard to the second, Tracy is aware of the problem of assuming a neutral form of "reason" in adjudicating such coherence. Still, his study would have been more helpful with specific examples to highlight some of the intractable problems in such a task. For instance, autonomy has been granted to the sciences by most western Christians but has not been by some other religious traditions in certain parts of the world, and so the notion of coherence begs the question. Tracy needs to grapple with the issues raised by Macintyre and Winch (among others) to move beyond the potentially sterile dichotomy implied in his notion of coherence. With regard to the third criterion there is question begging, too. Would Abraham have passed this test in his willingness to kill his son? Or... (shrink)

A collection of articles about P.A. Sorokin's work are preceded by a Russian translation of selected chapters of his 1947 work "Society, culture and personality" and a collection of correspondence (also translated into Russian) between him and Robert Merton.

Sustained attention, a key cognitive skill that improves during childhood and adolescence, tends to be worse in some emotional and behavioural disorders. Sustained attention is typically studied in non-affective task contexts; here, we used a novel task to index performance in affective versus neutral contexts across adolescence (N = 465; ages 11–18). We asked whether: (i) performance would be worse in negative versus neutral task contexts; (ii) performance would improve with age; (iii) affective interference would be greater in younger adolescents; (...) (iv) adolescents at risk for depression and higher in anxiety would show overall worse performance; and (v) would show differential performance in negative contexts. Results indicated that participants performed more poorly in negative contexts and showed age-related performance improvements. Those at risk of depression performed more poorly than those at lower risk. However, there was no difference between groups as a result of affective context. For anxiety there was no difference in performance as a function of severity. However, those with higher anxiety showed less variance in their reaction times to negative stimuli than those with lower anxiety. One interpretation is that moderate levels of emotional arousal associated with anxiety make individuals less susceptible to the distracting effects of negative stimuli. (shrink)

In response to Anne L. Dalle Ave and David M. Shaw, we agree with their general argument but emphasize a moral risk of HIV disclosure in deceased donation cases: the risk of relational rupture. Because of the importance that close relationships have to our sense of self and our life plans, this kind of rupture can have long-ranging implications for surviving loved ones. Moreover, the now-deceased individual cannot participate in any relational mending. Our analysis reveals the hefty moral costs that (...) disclosure can bring, which should influence what information is given to wouldbe donors and how organ procurement coordinators approach these conversations. (shrink)